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Abstract
Trait inference in person perception is based on observers’ implicit assumptions about the
relations between trait adjectives (e.g., fair) and the either consistent or inconsistent behav-
iors (e.g., having double standards) that an actor can manifest. This article presents new
empirical data and theoretical interpretations on people’ behavioral expectations, that is,
people’s perceived trait-behavior relations along the morality (versus competence) dimen-
sion. We specifically address the issue of the moderate levels of both traits and behaviors
almost neglected by prior research by using a measure of the perceived general frequency
of behaviors. A preliminary study identifies a set of competence- and morality-related traits
and a subset of traits balanced for valence. Studies 1–2 show that moral target persons are
associated with greater behavioral flexibility than immoral ones where abstract categories of
behaviors are concerned. For example, participants judge it more likely that a fair person
would behave unfairly than an unfair person would behave fairly. Study 3 replicates the
results of the first 2 studies using concrete categories of behaviors (e.g., telling the truth/
omitting some information). Study 4 shows that the positive asymmetry in morality-related
trait-behavior relations holds for both North-American and European (i.e., Italian) individu-
als. A small-scale meta-analysis confirms the existence of a positive asymmetry in trait-
behavior relations along both morality and competence dimensions for moderate levels of
both traits and behaviors. We discuss these findings in relation to prior models and results
on trait-behavior relations and we advance a motivational explanation based on self-
protection.
Introduction
Morality (e.g., trustworthiness, honesty, and sincerity) forms the primary basis for the general
evaluation of others [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Several studies in the area of person perception have revealed
that global impressions are influenced more by morality than by evidence related to other key
judgment domains, such as competence or sociability [5,7] (for a review, see [1]).
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Furthermore, morality-related traits are paramount and are treated differently from traits per-
taining to other dimensions (e.g., [8,9,10,11,12,13]). The distinctiveness of morality is also evi-
denced by a negativity effect that is absent in other realms (e.g., [14]). Indeed, past research has
shown that people give more weight to immoral behaviors and evidence that falsifies moral
traits, rather than moral behaviors and evidence that confirms morality (e.g., [2], Study 2;
[15,16]).
In the present research, we further deepened this research area focusing on “the flip side of
attribution” [17], namely people’s “behavior assumptions” (e.g., [18,19]). In other words, we
investigated the extent of the behavioral range associated with the positive and negative poles
of a trait when both traits and behaviors are moderate. Therefore, we aimed to answer the fol-
lowing question: When people have formed an initial impression (“an initial dispositional
characterization”, [20], p. 589) of a target person (e.g., “Homer is lazy”), how likely are they to
assume that the target person engages in trait-consistent (e.g., “Homer is lying on the sofa”) ver-
sus trait-inconsistent behaviors (e.g., “Homer is working hard”)? In other words, going beyond
the path from behaviors to traits (i.e., trait inference from behaviors), we examined the path
from traits to behaviors (i.e., the behavioral range associated with a trait).
More specifically, we explored behavior assumptions as a function of trait type (i.e., compe-
tence- versus morality-related traits); thus, we focused on the type and frequency of behaviors
people associate with a moral or competent (versus immoral and incompetent) target person.
Our hypothesis was that people would hold the implicit assumption that moral individuals are
more likely than immoral persons to behave in an inconsistent way.
Since trait-behavior relations guide the controlled, correction stage of trait attribution
(e.g., [20,21,22]), these asymmetries in behavioral expectations along the morality dimension
might inform our understanding of the origins of judgment biases in a key domain of social
perception.
Trait-behavior relations along morality versus competence dimensions:
Open questions
As noted previously, the weight assigned to the positive and negative poles of the morality-trait
continuum is asymmetric. One of the explanations given for this negativity effect in the moral
domain is based on people’s perceptions of trait-behavior relations, also known as “implica-
tional schemata” (e.g., [17,18,23,24]). These schemata are implicit assumptions that people
make about the range of behaviors that could be manifested at different (e.g., high, moderate,
low) trait levels. Trait-behavior relations were first analyzed by Reeder and Brewer [18] and
then empirically investigated in a systematic way by Reeder and colleagues [17]. In particular,
Reeder and colleagues [17] specified Reeder and Brewer’s [18] analysis by considering the
determinants of trait-behavior relations. Based on Heider’s [25] analysis of the constituents of
an actor’s action, they asked participants about their perceptions of the attempts (what people
try to do, that is, “intended variability”), ability (what people can do, “potential variability”),
and frequency (what people actually, or generally, do, “general variability”) of actors’ behaviors
in relation to three trait classes: morality, ability, and preference ([17], p. 359). Whereas the
measure of potential variability was designed to test trait-behavior relations for competence
traits, the measures of intended variability and general variability were related to trait-behavior
relations for morality. Their experiments showed that both competence and morality traits
were characterized by “directional tendencies” ([17], p. 356), or asymmetric relations between
trait levels and behaviors, in keeping with the “hierarchically restrictive schema” proposed by
Reeder and Brewer [18].
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More precisely, a trait pertaining to competence (e.g., intelligence/unintelligent) is more
behaviorally restricted at the negative extreme of its continuum than at its positive extreme.
For example, Reeder and colleagues [17] found that when using the potential variability mea-
sure (designed to test the trait-behavior relations for competence traits), participants thought
it unlikely that a very unintelligent person would be capable of portraying a person who is
highly intelligent. In contrast, a very intelligent person was thought of being more capable of
adequately portraying a very unintelligent person (see the negative slopes of dashed curves for
the ability traits in Reeder et al. [17], pp. 363 and 369). Traits pertaining to the morality dimen-
sion (e.g., honesty/dishonesty) are also asymmetric in their relations with behaviors, but with a
reverse pattern compared to competence-related traits. Hence, traits are more behaviorally
restricted at the positive extreme of the morality dimension than at its negative extreme. For
example, when using the intended variability measure (designed to test the trait-behavior rela-
tions for morality traits), Reeder et al. [17] found that participants judged it more likely that a
very dishonest person would try to act very honestly, than that a very honest person would try
to act very dishonestly if they were rewarded for doing so (see the positive slopes of dashed
curves for the morality traits in Reeder et al. [17], pp. 363 and 369). Therefore, individuals at
the negative extreme of a morality trait or at the positive extreme of a competence trait have a
wider range of behaviors at their disposal than individuals at the morality positive extreme or
competence negative extreme do.
The hierarchically restrictive schema describes also the implications for moderate levels of
both traits and behaviors in the competence and morality dimensions. People who possess
moderate traits are expected to engage in moderate trait-consistent behaviors. However,
depending on the situation, moderately intelligent and moderately unintelligent people are
also thought capable of very unintelligent behaviors, whereas moderately honest and moder-
ately dishonest people are also assumed to engage in very honest behaviors ([18], p. 68). In
contrast, there is a weak relation between moderate intelligence (i.e., being either moderately
intelligent or moderately unintelligent) and the perceived capability of performing extremely
intelligent behaviors and between moderate honesty (i.e., being either slightly honest or
slightly dishonest) and highly dishonest behaviors (see Fig 1; see also [17], p. 357 and [18],
p. 68).
Whether there is an asymmetry, in what direction and whether it is moderated by trait con-
tent for the moderate traits-moderate behaviors relation, is an open question that we aimed to
address with the present research. This question is relevant because most of the literature on
trait-behavior relations has focused on extreme levels of both traits and behaviors or on mod-
erate-extreme (and vice-versa) relations (e.g., [17]). This focus on extreme information paral-
lels a tendency found in the information integration literature to present participants with
extremely positive or extremely negative evidence to obtain reliable manipulations ([26], foot-
note 2). However, since moderate traits and moderate behaviors are more frequently observed
than extreme traits and behaviors in people’s everyday life, the analysis on the average levels of
traits and behaviors could be crucial.
Another open question concerning trait-behavior relations relates to the inconsistent find-
ings and theoretical interpretations obtained when the general variability measure has been
used in the literature. This measure assesses the perceived general frequency of behaviors and,
although it was originally thought to be relevant to trait-behavior relations for morality [17], it
has also been used with reference to competence traits [16,27]. (For more details about the
general variability measure and the justification of its use in the present research see S1 Text)
When either moderate traits or moderate behaviors were examined by means of the general
variability measure, prior research did not reveal any clear differences between morality and
competence [17]. The relation between moderate traits and extreme behaviors revealed an
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asymmetry whereby perceivers judged moderate persons to more frequently engage in
extreme socially desirable (e.g., very moral, very skillful) than extreme socially undesirable
(e.g., very immoral, very unskillful) behaviors; this effect was of similar magnitude for morality
than for competence ([17], Experiment 1). However, the relation between extreme traits and
moderate behaviors did not reveal any asymmetries or clear-cut differences between morality
and competence ([17], Experiment 2).
Skowronski and Carlston used a measure similar to the general variability measure and
tested moderate morality- and competence-related traits (“honest” and “dishonest” for moral-
ity, “intelligent” and “stupid” for competence) in relation to both moderate and extreme
morality-related and competence-related behaviors [16]. The findings concerning trait-incon-
sistent behaviors were collapsed over the moderate and extreme levels of behaviors (see [16],
p.693). However, the domain by valence interaction they found matched the pattern of the
hierarchically restrictive schema for extreme levels of both traits and behaviors and for the
moderate trait-extreme behavior relations. The only comparison between moderate and
extreme levels of behaviors revealed that perceivers judged it more likely that a person with a
moderate trait would emit moderate rather than extreme trait-inconsistent behaviors.
More recently, Tausch, Kenworthy, and Hewstone [27] investigated the perceived likeli-
hood of engaging in trait-inconsistent behaviors (a measure similar to the general variability
measure, which they called “diagnosticity” [27], p. 550) along competence- and warmth-
related moderate traits (e.g., “trustworthy”, “intelligent”). They used a procedure which mim-
icked Rothbart and Park’s [28] one, a method that most likely led participants to think about
moderate behaviors ([27], p. 548). Again, as suggested by the results in Skowronski and Carl-
ston’s [16] study, Tausch et al.’s [27] results were consistent with the description of the
Fig 1. Representation of the hierarchical restrictive schema [17,18]. Positive competence- (left) and morality-related (right) traits (e.g.,
intelligent and honest). +, ±, and − indicate high, moderate, and low levels of traits/behaviors. Solid arrows indicate strong trait-behavior
relations, whereas dashed arrows indicate weak trait-behavior relations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g001
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hierarchically restrictive schema for extreme levels of both traits and behaviors and for the
moderate trait-extreme behavior relations rather than for moderate levels of both traits and
behaviors.
Thus, an account of moderate levels of trait-behavior relations underlying morality (versus
competence) traits that uses a measure of general variability [17] and that could reconcile these
theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in the literature is still needed.
The positive asymmetry hypothesis for moderate morality traits
Some theories and findings in the literature are supportive of a positive asymmetry in trait-
behavior relations for moderate, morality-related information. Studies in the 1970s have
shown that trait adjectives can be represented as distributions and negative traits have nar-
rower dispersions than neutral and positive traits (e.g., [29,30,31,32]). These findings suggest
that immoral people could have a narrower range of behaviors than moral people could. Roth-
bart and Park [28] found that traits such as “intelligent” and “honest” require many instances
to confirm and few instances to disconfirm ([28], p. 138). This finding suggests that traits
related to competence and morality might share some structural asymmetries. In particular,
concerning the trait-behavior relation asymmetry, perceivers might require many instances
before they describe a target person with a positive trait because they might assume that targets
with a positive trait engage more likely in trait-inconsistent behaviors than do targets with a
negative trait.
Empirical evidence from information integration studies on morality judgments also sup-
ports a positive asymmetry in trait-behavior relations at moderate levels of morality-related
information. Wojciszke and colleagues [26] found a negativity effect in trait inferences and
likeability evaluations of a target person when participants were given two extremely positive
behaviors (e.g., “Having noticed that a shop assistant gave him too much change, Paul
returned the surplus”) and two extremely negative behaviors (e.g., “Paul caused an accident
and ran away”) describing the target and pertaining to morality-related traits (e.g., “honest” vs.
“dishonest”). However, this effect disappeared in the condition in which participants received
moderately positive (e.g., “Paul told the examiner that he did not know the answer to a ques-
tion on the exam”) and negative (e.g., “Paul pushed himself to the head of a long queue”)
behaviors. As discussed by Wojciszke and colleagues, these findings concerning morality-
related information are in keeping with results of other information integration studies on
morality judgments by Birnbaum ([33], Fig 1A) and Skowronski and Carlston ([16], Experi-
ment 2).
The present research
Based on the reviewed literature, we hypothesized that people would think it more likely that a
moral social target would engage in trait-inconsistent behaviors (i.e., a moral person acting
immorally) than that an immoral target would emit trait-inconsistent behaviors (i.e., an
immoral person acting morally). In other words, we expected a positive asymmetry for the
moderate traits and behaviors along the morality dimension when using a measure similar to
the general variability measure [17]. This hypothesized positive asymmetry with regard to
morality traits is in line with prior research that showed that people tend to question others’
morality (e.g., [2,34]). Thus, people would prefer to risk committing commission errors by
considering a moral person as being able to behave also immorally rather than committing
omission errors in which a moral behavior would be expected from an immoral person. A par-
allel motivational argument cannot be made based on the reverse assumption. Indeed, assum-
ing that an immoral person is able to behave in a moral fashion is not as self-protecting as the
Positive asymmetry in trait-behavior relations
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reverse assumption that a moral person is able to behave immorally. This view dovetails with
the finding by Trafimow and Schneider ([35], Experiment 2) that a single dishonest behavior
induces most people to describe the actor as dishonest (see also [31,33]). Moreover, Meindl
and colleagues [34] have recently shown an “immoral assumption effect”, whereby people are
more prone to make negative morality-related trait attributions (“trait assumptions”) based
on a target’s immoral behavior rather than unsociable trait attributions after a cold behavior.
This difference did not hold for positive assumptions. Our hypothesis of narrower behavioral
ranges associated with negative vs. positive traits for morality is consistent with range theories
of information integration in impression formation by Wyer [29] and Birnbaum [30]. Indeed,
“it is less likely for a person possessing a dislikable trait to be likable than for a person with a
likable trait to be dislikable.” ([31], p. 560)
Furthermore, our hypothesis builds on Rothbart and Park’s [28] perspective according to
which confirmation of positive traits is hard and disconfirmation is easy for both morality and
competence. According to the authors, frequency is not the only factor likely to influence the
ease of trait dis/confirmability [28]. In particular, a crucial variable is trait favorability.
Whereas positive traits are easy to lose and difficult to acquire, negative traits are easy to
acquire but difficult to lose. Furthermore, once a trait has been established and must be con-
firmed or disconfirmed (as at the correction stage), it is generally easier to imagine negative
behaviors that disconfirm positive traits than positive behaviors that disconfirm negative traits.
Moreover, there are generally more occasions for disconfirming positive traits than negative
traits ([28], p. 137). These findings led us to hypothesize that people would think it more likely
that trait-inconsistent behaviors are emitted by an actor possessing a positive rather than a
negative trait related to the morality dimension. We expected a positive asymmetry in trait-
behavior relations also for moderate competence-related traits. The hypothesized positivity
along the competence dimension is based on the aforementioned finding that both “intelli-
gent” and “honest” require many instances to confirm and few instances to disconfirm ([28],
p. 138) and the positivity in competence impressions based on moderate behaviors found in
information integration [26].
Studies overview
To investigate the hypothesis that moral people would be more likely expected to engage in
trait-inconsistent behaviors than immoral people for moderate levels of both traits and behav-
iors, we conducted four studies based on a pretest described in S2 Text and S1 Table. The
studies have been approved by the University of Milano-Bicocca Ethics Committee (Prot. N.
0025855/13), in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the Oviedo Convention. For
all the studies, participants were properly instructed about the nature of the tasks and the gen-
eral aims. Participants provided their informed consent to participate in the electronic form
when not possible in other ways (i.e., when the task was administered online), and this proce-
dure was approved by the ethics committee. In Study 1, we addressed the issue of perceived
behavioral range associated with moderately positive versus negative traits using abstract cate-
gories of behavior and requiring probability estimates (in the form of percentages) from partic-
ipants. We used a restrictiveness index whereby the probability of trait-inconsistent behavior
for the negative trait pole was subtracted from the same probability for persons with a positive
trait. In Study 2, we examined the same process by changing two methodological properties.
First, we used a frequency format instead of a probability format because people judge fre-
quencies more easily than probabilities (e.g., [36]). Second, we used a restrictiveness index that
incorporated participants’ estimates of the unconditional likelihood of behaviors. Study 3 con-
sidered concrete categories of behavior. In a pretest described in S5 Text, we asked participants
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to produce a series of trait-inconsistent behaviors for each pole of a trait continuum, and we
analyzed the number of produced behaviors. In Study 3, we used the pretested set of behaviors
to ask participants about the frequency with which people would engage in these behaviors. In
Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that the effects found in the previous four studies would hold
cross-culturally. Accordingly, we asked both Italian and US participants to estimate the likeli-
hood of trait-inconsistent behaviors. Finally, we conducted a small-scale meta-analysis to test
the findings’ reliability.
Study 1
In Study 1, we investigated participants’ perceptions of moderate levels of trait-behavior rela-
tions for traits involving competence and morality. For each of the pretested traits (see S2 and
S3 Text), we asked participants to estimate the probability that an actor possessing a trait (e.g.,
honesty) would manifest trait-inconsistent behaviors (e.g., dishonest behaviors).
Method
Participants
Forty-eight Italian undergraduate students (35 female, 13 male, Mage = 21.96, SDage = 2.04,
range: 19–29 years) volunteered to participate in the study.
Materials and procedure
Participants were given a booklet. On the first page, they were told that the investigation con-
cerned “information search in social contexts”. They were also asked to provide their demo-
graphic details. On the second page, they were instructed as follows: “In the following pages,
you will be presented with a series of questions concerning some characteristics. Your task is
to read and answer all of the questions by marking with an ‘X’ the box with a percentage
between 0 (which indicates ‘totally unlikely’) and 100 (‘totally likely’) that best corresponds to
your judgment. Please answer all of the questions in this questionnaire”. A series of 46 ques-
tions followed, two for each pretested trait, each followed by an 11-point scale ranging from
0% (totally unlikely) to 100% (totally likely). Participants were required to provide probability
estimates that a person with a trait would exhibit trait-inconsistent behaviors. First, for each
pretested trait, participants evaluated the probability that a target person with a positive trait
(e.g., an honest/intelligent person) would exhibit opposite behaviors (e.g., dishonest/stupid
behaviors). Then, the participants estimated the probability of the reverse pattern. That is, they
estimated the probability that a target person with a negative trait (e.g., a dishonest/stupid per-
son) would manifest positive behaviors (e.g., honest/intelligent behaviors). To control for
order effects, we devised a second version of the questionnaire with the trait presentation in
the reverse order. Two questions presented to participants for the morality dimension were:
“How likely do you consider it that an honest person would behave in a dishonest fashion?”
and “How likely do you consider it that a dishonest person would behave in an honest fash-
ion?” Two sample questions for the competence domain were: “How likely do you consider it
that an intelligent person would behave in a stupid fashion?” and “How likely do you consider
it that a stupid person would behave in an intelligent fashion?” This question phrasing is simi-
lar to the one used by Tausch et al. (Study 3) [27] for their “diagnosticity” measure (see also S1
Text). Our method does not consider instances of extreme traits and behaviors (i.e., the likeli-
hood of highly honest people to engage in very dishonest behaviors) in a similar way to Roth-
bart and Park’s [28] and Tausch et al.’s [27] methods ([27], p. 548).
Positive asymmetry in trait-behavior relations
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Results
We computed the difference between the two probability estimates provided by participants
for each trait to obtain a restrictiveness index (R):
R ¼ pð:DjHÞ   pðDj:HÞ; ð1Þ
where p (means “probability of”, | represents “given that”, ¬ is the logical symbol for negation,
D represents the positively valenced behavioral evidence, ¬D is the negatively valenced behav-
ioral evidence, and H represents the hypothesized trait. Consider, for example, the honest/dis-
honest trait. We computed R as the difference between the participant’s probability estimate of
observing dishonest behaviors, ¬D, from an honest person, H, and the participant’s probability
estimate of observing honest behaviors, D, performed by a dishonest person, ¬H.
R is positive when the person possessing the positively valenced trait (e.g., honesty) is
thought to have at her disposal a wider range of behaviors (i.e., she might also behave counter
to her disposition) than the person with the opposite trait (e.g., dishonesty). Vice versa, R is
negative when the person with a negative trait (e.g., a dishonest person) is expected to manifest
a wider range of behaviors than the person with a positive trait does (e.g., an honest person).
Finally, R is zero when persons with opposite traits have equal probabilities of exhibiting
behaviors contrary to their traits.
We averaged the eight competence’s Rs because they were highly consistent (Cronbach’s
α = .89). For the same reason, we combined the Rs of the 15 morality-related traits (Cronbach’s
α = .88). We then compared both the competence and the morality R indexes with zero, which
is the value indicating symmetry between the two opposite poles of a trait, using one-sample t-
tests. Furthermore, we compared the competence and morality R indexes to each other using a
paired t-test. For each of the three t-tests, we used adjusted alpha levels of .0167 according to
the correction for multiple testing illustrated by Benjamini and Hochberg [37]. We found that
the competence index (M = 4.38, SD = 19.28), 95% CI of the difference [-1.22, 9.97], was not
significantly different from zero, t(47) = 1.57, p = .123, d = .23. Furthermore, the difference
between the morality index (M = 5.63, SD = 15.05), 95% CI of the difference [1.26, 9.99], and
zero was significant, t(47) = 2.59, p = .013, d = .37. These results indicate that participants per-
ceived the two poles of competence-related traits as having equal behavioral flexibility. In con-
trast, people with positive morality-related traits were perceived as having a wider range of
behaviors than people with negative traits (Fig 2).
Finally, we did not find a significant difference between the two R indexes (95% CI of the
difference [-5.69, 3.19]), t(47) = -.57, p = .574, d = .08. (Cohen’s d was corrected for the depen-
dence between means as illustrated by Morris & DeShon, Equation 8 [38]. We shall refer to
this correction as Cohen’s corrected d in the subsequent analyses).
Controlling for trait valence
Some confounds might have muddied the previous comparisons between competence-related
and morality-related traits. They both relate to trait valence, which is a crucial dimension in
trait attribution (e.g., [28,39,40]). First, competence traits could have been more polarized than
morality traits or vice versa at either the positive or the negative pole of the traits. Second,
within each domain, traits could have been biased to yield an asymmetry between the positive
and the negative poles of the traits. For example, immoral traits could have been valued as
more polarized than moral traits, potentially accounting for the finding that immoral target
persons were judged to be more behaviorally restricted (i.e., unlikely to perform moral behav-
iors) than moral target persons (who were also likely to exhibit immoral behaviors). In S3
Text, we report the analyses we conducted to control for these possible confounders. We
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found that the following traits were balanced for valence: intelligent/stupid, efficient/ineffi-
cient, and competent/incompetent for the competence domain and righteous/unrighteous,
sincere/insincere, and fair/unfair for the morality domain. Although we did not use the adverb
“very” that could have conveyed the extremity of traits, we confirmed that the selected traits
were perceived as moderate by analyzing the participants’ valence ratings (see S3 Text).
Analyses on the trait subsets balanced for valence
Once we identified the competence and morality traits that were sufficiently balanced for
valence, we reanalyzed the data. For each of the five t-tests we will present in this subsection,
we used adjusted significance levels of .0200 following Benjamini and Hochberg’s method
[37]. R was not highly consistent across the three competence traits (i.e., intelligent/stupid, effi-
cient/inefficient, and competent/incompetent), Cronbach’s α = .58. Therefore, we considered
each competence trait separately. We performed three one-sample t-tests to compare R with
zero, that is, the value of trait symmetry. We found that all of the competence traits had a
Fig 2. Results of the analysis on the larger set of traits in Study 1. The difference between the likelihoods of trait-
inconsistent behaviors for the positive and negative poles of traits (restrictiveness index) was significantly positive for
morality-related but not competence-related traits. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g002
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positive R, but only the value of R relative to the intelligent/stupid disposition was significantly
higher than zero (Table 1).
R was consistent across the three morality traits (i.e., righteous/unrighteous, sincere/insin-
cere, and fair/unfair), Cronbach’s α = .72. Therefore, we averaged the three traits’ values
and compared the obtained R value with zero using a one-sample t-test. We found that R
(M = 7.43, SD = 18.45), 95% CI of the difference [2.07, 12.79], was significantly higher than
zero, t(47) = 2.79, p = .008, d = .4.
Finally, we compared the R values of competence- and morality-related traits (each col-
lapsed across the three traits) by means of a paired t-test. We found that R did not differ signif-
icantly whether the traits related to competence (M = 8.33, SD = 17.52) or morality (M = 7.43,
SD = 18.45), 95% CI of the difference [-6, 4.19], t(47) = -.36, p = .723, Cohen’s corrected
d = .05.
Discussion
Study 1 revealed that the traits along the morality/immorality dimension were perceived as
positively asymmetric. The positive poles of the moral traits were perceived as more behavior-
ally unrestricted than the negative ones. In other words, the participants assumed that individ-
uals with a positive morality-related trait would engage in trait-inconsistent behaviors to a
greater extent than individuals with a negative trait would do. This finding held both when
considering a large set of traits and when analyzing a subset of these traits pretested for
valence.
Overall, we found that competence-related traits were perceived as having equal behavioral
flexibility at the opposite poles of the traits. Indeed, the R index was not significantly different
from zero, which indicated trait symmetry. The exception concerned the intelligent/stupid
trait, which was perceived as positively asymmetric. The comparison between the R indexes of
competence and morality revealed that the two dimensions did not differ significantly in
terms of restrictiveness.
Study 2
An important aspect of Study 1 is that the participants might have found it difficult to express
their judgments in terms of probabilities, and this difficulty might have partly accounted for
the results. Indeed, past research has shown that people might find it easier to receive input
and produce output in the form of frequencies rather than probabilities (e.g., [36,41]). There-
fore, in Study 2, we changed the question phrasing used in Study 1 by replacing the probability
(in the form of percentages) with a frequentist question. This question phrasing is closer to
that used by Reeder et al. [17] to assess “general variability” ([17], p. 361) compared with the
one used in Study 1. Furthermore, we took into account the base rate of behaviors, as we shall
explain in the following section.
Table 1. Study 1: Results of one-sample t-tests. Comparisons of the restrictiveness indexes (R) with zero (that indicates symmetry of restrictiveness) for
the competence-related traits balanced for valence.
Trait Mean (SD) 95% CI of the Difference t-value (df) p-value Cohen’s d
Intelligent/stupid 18.33 (24.35) [11.26, 25.4] 5.22 (47) < .001 .75
Efficient/inefficient 3.96 (23.22) [-2.78, 10.7] 1.18(47) .244 .17
Competent/incompetent 2.71 (23.59) [-4.14, 9.56] .8 (47) .430 .11
Note. CI = confidence interval.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.t001
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Method
Participants
Fifty-two Italian undergraduate students (36 female, 16 male, Mage = 22.87, SDage = 4.41,
range: 19–51 years) volunteered to participate in the study.
Materials and procedure
Materials and procedure were the same as in Study 1 except as follows. The participants were
asked to estimate how many times, out of 10 behaviors, a person with a trait would manifest
trait-inconsistent behaviors. For example, participants were asked, “Out of 10 behaviors, how
many times do you think that an honest person would behave in a dishonest fashion?” Then,
they were asked the reverse: “Out of 10 behaviors, how many times do you think that a dishon-
est person would behave in an honest fashion?” Participants were asked to mark with an “X” a
number between 0 and 10. We devised four versions of the questionnaire to control for order
effects. Therefore, we varied the trait presentation order (the original one versus the reverse
one) and the question presentation order (the first judgment was about a person with a posi-
tively valenced disposition versus a negatively valenced disposition).
In addition, at the end of the questionnaire, the participants were required to provide an
estimate of the prevalence of each trait. For example, they were asked: “Out of 10 persons, how
many do you consider honest?” Again, the participants were required to mark with an “X” a
number between 0 and 10. We did not ask about the prevalence of the negatively valenced dis-
positions because we assumed that their prevalence was complementary to the prevalence of
the positive trait ends. Therefore, there were 23 trait-prevalence questions. As we shall explain
in the Results section, this additional request from the participants, compared with the task
requirement in Study 1, allowed us to compute the frequency of behavior, which is a factor
that influences trait attribution (e.g., [28]). Reeder and colleagues ([19], p. 42; [20], p. 587)
argued that a base-rate principle underlies trait-behavior relations along morality traits rather
than along competence traits. We argue that base-rate considerations are equally relevant for
competence and morality traits and that it is reasonable to incorporate the base-rate principle
in the computation of a restrictiveness index for both competence and morality traits.
Results
We used the estimates of trait prevalence among people (i.e., the responses to the 23 final ques-
tions of the questionnaires) to obtain a modified restrictiveness index. In doing so, we con-
verted all of the participants’ frequency estimates into probabilities by dividing them by 10.
Thus, the scale of the obtained values ranged from 0 to 1, and we could straightforwardly apply
a Bayesian analysis (for the use of this type of analysis in a social hypothesis-testing study, see,
e.g., [42]; see also [43,44]). Trait-prevalence estimates correspond to prior probabilities under
a Bayesian perspective, that is, to p(H) where H, in our questions, was the number of persons
deemed to possess a particular trait. From prior probabilities, one can derive the probability of
occurrence of behaviors, that is, p(D), by means of the following equation (e.g., [42], p. 248):
pðDÞ ¼ pðDjHÞ  pðHÞ þ pðDj:HÞ  pð:HÞ; ð2Þ
where p(D|H) stands for the probability of observing a new datum, D, given the truth of the
hypothesis under consideration, H. For example, this could be the probability of an honest
behavior, D, being performed by an honest person, H. Therefore, this term was the comple-
ment of the participants’ estimate of how often a dishonest behavior, ¬D, was performed by an
honest person, H. We derived p(D|H) from the participants’ estimates using the following
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equation:
pðDjHÞ ¼ 1   pð:DjHÞ: ð3Þ
The other terms in (Eq 2) are trait prevalence (that is, the prior probability that a person has
a particular disposition, p(H)), and its complement, p(¬H) = 1 − p(H) (that is, the probability
that a person does not have a particular disposition). Finally, p(D|¬H) represents the probabil-
ity of observing a new datum given the falsity of the hypothesis under consideration, such as
the probability of an honest behavior, D, displayed by a dishonest person, ¬H.
p(¬D) was computed as the complement of p(D) using the following equation (see, e.g.,
[42], p. 248):
pð:DÞ ¼ 1   pðDÞ: ð4Þ
We analyzed the participants’ estimates of trait prevalence among people, that is, p(H), and
the derived probabilities of occurrence of behaviors, that is, p(D). The findings were consistent
with the negative assumptions about other people’s morality found by Meindl and colleagues
[34]. Participants’ estimates of the number of people possessing a positive morality-related
trait, were significantly lower than p = .05, whereas the difference from the chance level was
not significant for positive competence-related traits. The probabilities of occurrence of posi-
tively valenced behaviors that we derived in the way explained above were also significantly
lower than the p = .05 for the morality dimension, but not for the competence dimension.
These results held both when considering the large set of morality- and competence-related
traits and when analyzing the subsets of traits that were balanced for valence (see S4 Text for a
detailed description of these findings).
Furthermore, we could compute a revised R index that weighted the terms used in (Eq 1)
by the values of Eqs (2) and (4), that is, p(D) and p(¬D). The resulting index was
Rr ¼ jpð:DÞ   pð:DjHÞj   jpðDÞ   pðDj:HÞj; ð5Þ
the difference between a participant’s estimate that a person with a positively valenced trait
would manifest trait-inconsistent behaviors, p(¬D|H), and the estimate that a person with a
negatively valenced trait would behave counter to it, p(¬D|H), each weighted by the probability
of the occurrence of the trait-inconsistent behaviors (a similar index in the context of asym-
metric information search was used by Sacchi, Rusconi, Russo, Bettiga, & Cherubini [45]).
Again, as for the R index in (Eq 1), Rr yields positive or negative values as a function of whether
the frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors is judged higher for the positive or the negative
trait pole, whereas it is equal to zero if there is no difference between the positive and the nega-
tive trait pole.
We averaged the Rr indexes of the eight competence-related traits (Cronbach’s α = .88), and
the 15 morality-related traits (Cronbach’s α = .91). Using one-sample t-tests, we then com-
pared both the competence and the morality Rr indexes with zero to determine their degree of
restrictiveness. We also compared the competence Rr index with the morality Rr index using a
paired t-test. For each of these three t-tests, we used corrected significance levels of .0333
according to Benjamini and Hochberg’s method [37]. We found that the competence Rr index
(M = -.03, SD = .16), 95% CI of the difference [-.07, .02], was not significantly different from
zero, t(51) = -1.16, p = .250, d = .16. In contrast, the morality Rr index (M = .1, SD = .14), 95%
CI of the difference [.06, .14], was significantly higher than zero, t(51) = 5.03, p< .001, d = .7.
Finally, there was a significant difference between competence and morality (95% CI of the dif-
ference [-.17, -.08]), t(51) = -6.01, p< .001, Cohen’s corrected d = .87, indicating that the
morality-related traits were overall more positively asymmetric (with the positively valenced
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pole of the trait continuum being more behaviorally unrestricted than the negatively valenced
one) than the competence-related traits (Fig 3).
Analyses of the trait subsets balanced for valence
Following the same procedure used in Study 1, we performed the same analyses using Rr on
the subsets of three competence-related and three morality-related traits that were balanced
for valence. For each of the following three t-tests, we used adjusted alpha levels of .0333 after
Benjamini and Hochberg’s correction [37]. Cronbach’s alphas for the Rr of the three compe-
tence traits, .77, and the Rr of the three morality traits, .73, were sufficiently high to allow us to
combine the three traits of each domain. The one-sample t-tests comparing each collapsed
variable with zero showed that the competence Rr index (M = -.02, SD = .17), 95% CI of the dif-
ference [-.06, .03], was not significantly different from zero, t(51) = -.76, p = .452, d = .1. In
contrast, the morality Rr index (M = .07, SD = .15), 95% CI of the difference [.03, .12], was sig-
nificantly higher than zero, t(51) = 3.51, p = .001, d = .49.
Finally, as indicated in the analyses of the larger set of traits, there was a significant differ-
ence between the competence Rr index and the morality Rr index (95% CI of the difference
Fig 3. Results of the analysis on the larger set of traits in Study 2. The difference between the likelihoods of trait-
inconsistent behaviors for the positive and negative poles of traits (restrictiveness index) was significantly positive for
morality-related but not competence-related traits. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g003
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[-.14, -.05]), t(51) = -3.94, p< .001, Cohen’s corrected d = .54, indicating higher positive asym-
metry of the moral traits versus the competence traits (Fig 4).
Discussion
The findings of Study 2 largely replicated the pattern of results found in Study 1, even with
facilitated question phrasing (with a frequentist format) and a restrictiveness index that incor-
porated the perceived frequency of behaviors in the population. The participants perceived
morality-related traits as positively asymmetric, whereby the positive trait were more likely
associated with trait-inconsistent behaviors than the negative traits. For example, the partici-
pants assumed that a fair person would more frequently engage in unfair behaviors than an
unfair person would perform fair behaviors. Competence-related traits were judged as sym-
metric. That is, the participants believed that a competent person would be as likely as an
incompetent person to perform trait-inconsistent behaviors. These results held both when
considering a large set of competence- and morality-related traits and when focusing on the
traits that were balanced for valence. Beyond providing converging evidence for the reliability
of the results from Study 1, these findings indicate that the information format does not per se
Fig 4. Results of the analysis on the subset of traits in Study 2. The difference between the likelihoods of trait-
inconsistent behaviors for the positive and negative poles of traits (restrictiveness index) was significantly positive for
morality-related but not competence-related traits. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g004
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affect the perceived trait-behavior relations. If anything, the different information formats
used in Studies 1–2 could account for the different results from the comparison between the
competence and morality restrictiveness indexes. Indeed, in Study 2, the difference in restric-
tiveness was more pronounced than in Study 1. Competence-related traits were closer to zero
(i.e., the value that indicates the symmetry in restrictiveness between the positive and negative
trait pole) than in Study 1.
Study 3
Study 3 addressed the issue of using abstract behavioral categories in the empirical tests of the
validity of the implicational schemata (e.g., [17]). The use of trait labels instead of actual behav-
iors might induce participants to provide biased estimates of behavioral ranges due to the
vagueness and variability inherent in trait labels. Therefore, we asked the participants to pro-
vide frequency estimates of trait-inconsistent actual behaviors.
Method
Participants
Eighty-eight students (77 female, 11 male, Mage = 24.03, SDage = 4.87, range: 19–51 years) vol-
unteered to participate in the study. Eighty-six participants were Italian, one was Egyptian,
and one was Romanian. The sample comprised mostly undergraduate students from the facul-
ties of psychology, sociology, economics, mathematics, and physics. One participant was an
educator, one was a psychologist, two were freelance professionals, and some were apprentices
or student workers.
Materials and procedure
The study was conducted online by means of the software SurveyMonkey, which is used to cre-
ate and administer surveys. Participants estimated how often a person with a disposition (e.g.,
a sincere person) performed a particular trait-inconsistent behavior. Behaviors were drawn
from those produced by participants in S5 Text. We selected two trait-inconsistent behaviors
for each trait pole based on those most frequently evoked in that study. Therefore, there were
four behaviors (two trait-consistent and two trait-inconsistent) for each trait and a total of 24
behaviors. We wanted to ensure that the selected behaviors were perceived by participants as
consistent with respect to the hypothesized trait pole. Therefore, we asked participants to esti-
mate the frequency that a person would perform a particular trait-consistent behavior. The
addition of this manipulation check (which tested the actual association between a given
behavior and a trait) doubled the number of questions to 48. Participants responded on an
11-point scale from 0 (a little) to 10 (a lot). Questions were presented on six screen pages, one
for each bipolar trait that was pretested for both relatedness and valence: righteous/unrigh-
teous, sincere/insincere, and fair/unfair for the morality domain and intelligent/stupid, effi-
cient/inefficient, and competent/incompetent for the competence domain. Questions were
randomized within each of the six screen pages (i.e., randomization occurred across questions
pertaining to the same trait but not across different traits). Furthermore, we randomized the
presentation order of the six screen pages. Sample questions for the sincere/insincere trait
included: “How often does an insincere person tell the truth?” and “How often does a sincere
person omit some information?” (We report the original Italian items together with an English
translation in S6 Text).
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Results
Manipulation check
We first checked that participants perceived the behaviors we selected from the pretest (S5
Text) as actually related to the corresponding traits. Instead of using the scale midpoint (i.e., 5)
as a threshold for considering a behavior as associated with the corresponding disposition, we
decided to be more conservative and use a higher level in the scale, that is, 6 as a reference
point. We performed a series of one-sample t-tests to compare the 0–10 estimates that partici-
pants provided to manipulation-check questions (e.g., “How often a sincere person tells the
truth?”, “How often an insincere person omits some information?”) with 6. We used the Benja-
mini and Hochberg’s corrected significance levels of p = .0479. All of the participants’ estimates
(Ms 6.85, SDs 2.42), 95% CI of the difference [ .45, 1.26], were significantly higher
than the scale point of 6, ts(87) 4.19, ps< .001, ds .45. The exception was the question
“How often an inefficient person loses herself in details?” for which participants’ mean esti-
mates (M = 6.43, SD = 2.15), 95% CI of the difference [-.02, .89], were not significantly higher
than 6, t(87) = 1.89, p = .063, d = .2. However, the comparison with the scale midpoint (5) was
significant, t(87) = 6.25, p< .001, d = .67. Therefore, we concluded that the selected behaviors
were perceived by participants as pertaining to the hypothesized correspondent dispositions.
Analyses of trait-inconsistent behavior frequency
The two frequency estimates of the trait-inconsistent behaviors for each trait pole were signifi-
cantly positively correlated, Pearson’s rs .21, N = 88, ps .049. Therefore, we collapsed over
the two judgments that participants provided for each trait pole. We then used (Eq 1) and we
computed the difference between the perceived frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors when
the target person has a positive trait and the perceived frequency of trait-inconsistent behav-
iors when the target person has a negative trait. We compared the combined R indexes for
competence and morality with zero by using one-sample t-tests. We also compared the R val-
ues of competence- and morality-related traits by means of a paired t-test. For each of these
three t-tests, we used corrected p-values of .0333 according to Benjamini and Hochberg’s [37]
method. There was symmetry in the frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors between the pos-
itive and negative trait poles for the competence-related traits (M = -.11, SD = 1.1), 95% CI of
the difference [-.34, .13], t(87) = -.9, p = .370, d = .1. As to the morality-related traits, we found
a positive asymmetry, that is, a higher frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors associated with
positive trait poles than the reverse (M = .28, SD = 1.21), 95% CI of the difference [.03, .54],
t(87) = 2.18, p = .032, d = .23.
There was a significant difference between the collapsed morality-related traits compared
with the collapsed competence-related traits (95% CI of the difference [-.72, -.05]), t(87) = -2.3,
p = .024, Cohen’s corrected d = .25, indicating a higher positive asymmetry for morality than
for competence traits (Fig 5).
S7 Text presents an analysis of the frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors with a different
dependent variable, that is, the “cue-validity index” ([16], p. 692). The findings were consistent
with those of the previous analysis showing a positive asymmetry for the morality dimension
and symmetry for the competence dimension, although the difference between the morality
and competence indexes was not significant.
Discussion
Study 3 showed that participants tended to associate greater behavioral flexibility with moral
rather than immoral target persons when they were presented with concrete categories of
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behavior. For example, participants perceived it to be more likely that a sincere person would
“omit some information” or “cover for somebody” than an insincere person would “tell the
truth” or “disclose their feelings to the one they love”. This finding can be interpreted in keep-
ing with the influence of trait favorability on the confirmability and disconfirmability of trait
concepts [28]. Indeed, a favorable trait (e.g., sincere) is easier to lose if a person engages in
trait-inconsistent behaviors (such as omitting some information) than if she/he is behaviorally
restricted. In a similar way, an unfavorable trait (e.g., insincere) is more difficult to lose if a per-
son hardly ever engages in trait-inconsistent behaviors (e.g., telling the truth) than if she/he is
behaviorally flexible. With regard to the competence dimension, participants perceived an
overall balance between the trait-inconsistent behaviors associated with the positive and nega-
tive poles of competence-related traits. For example, they perceived it to be equally likely that
an efficient person would “take too much time to complete work” or would “lose themselves in
details” and that an inefficient person would “respect their working hours and instructions” or
would “commit to completing work”.
Fig 5. Results of the analysis on the frequency of trait-inconsistent behaviors in Study 3. The difference between
the estimated frequencies of trait-inconsistent behaviors for the positive and negative poles of traits (restrictiveness index)
was significantly positive for morality- but not competence-related traits. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g005
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Study 4
Previous research that directly investigated trait-behavior relations was conducted in the US
([16], Experiment 1; [17]) or in the UK ([27]), whereas our studies used samples of Italian par-
ticipants. Study 4 is cross-cultural and addresses the issue of whether the results of our previ-
ous studies generalize across Italian and American participants.
Method
Participants
The sample comprised 221 participants (129 female, 92 male, Mage = 34.05, SDage = 12.45,
range: 18–68 years). One-hundred and thirteen participants were US citizens (61 female, 52
male, Mage = 38.44, SDage = 12.62, range: 18–68 years), and 108 were Italians (68 female, 40
male, Mage = 29.45, SDage = 10.5, range: 19–68 years).
Materials and procedure
We devised two online surveys, one for the US sample and one for the Italian one, by means of
the software SurveyMonkey. The US sample was recruited and received the link to the Survey-
Monkey survey by means of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This is a website used by researchers
(“requesters”) to post jobs (e.g., surveys) which can be done by participants (“workers”) for
pay. The advantage of using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is that researchers have access to
large, diverse samples of participants, rapidly, and at low cost [46,47,48]. We reached partici-
pants of the Italian sample by means of social networks such as Facebook.
In either survey, the study was presented as research on “information search in social con-
texts”. After the introduction page, participants were instructed to estimate how likely a person
with a trait would manifest trait-inconsistent behaviors. For example, participants were asked:
“How likely do you consider it that a righteous person would behave in an unrighteous fash-
ion?” Then, they were asked the reverse: “How likely do you consider it that an unrighteous
person would behave in a righteous fashion?” Participants were asked to click the percentage
between 0 (totally unlikely) and 100 (totally likely). We presented in a single page, in a random-
ized order, 6 questions related to the competence dimension (i.e., intelligent-stupid, efficient-
inefficient, competent-incompetent, stupid-intelligent, inefficient-efficient, incompetent-com-
petent) and 6 questions related to the morality dimension (righteous-unrighteous, sincere-
insincere, fair-unfair, unrighteous-righteous, insincere-sincere, unfair-fair) using the trait
pairs that were pretested for relatedness and valence.
Finally, the participants were asked to provide their demographic information, that is, gen-
der, age, nationality, profession, and faculty (if student).
Results
The dependent variable was the difference between the estimates of trait-inconsistent behav-
iors when the target has a positive trait and the estimates of trait-inconsistent behaviors when
the target has a negative trait (see Eq 1).
We computed average scores for competence (Cronbach’s alpha: .75) and morality (Cron-
bach’s alpha: .67). We then subjected these scores to a 2 (trait dimension: competence vs.
morality) × 2 (nationality: American vs. Italian) mixed-design ANOVA, with trait dimension
manipulated within participants and nationality as a between-participants variable. We found
a significant main effect of trait dimension, F(1, 219) = 8.75, p = .003, η2 = .038, showing that,
irrespective of participants’ nationality, estimates were higher for competence (M = .07,
SE = .01), 95% CI [.05, .1], than for morality (M = .03, SE = .01), 95% CI [.01, .06], 95% CI
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for difference [.01, .06]. There was also a significant main effect of nationality, F(1, 219) = 10,
p = .002, η2 = .040, indicating that the difference scores were overall significantly higher for
Italian (M = .09, SE = .02), 95% CI [.06, .12], than for US participants (M = .02, SE = .02),
95% CI [-.02, .05], 95% CI for difference [.03, .12]. Crucially to test the hypothesis that our
findings hold cross-culturally, nationality did not interact with trait dimension, F(1, 219) =
.13, p = .724, η2 = .000.
Finally, we compared the competence and morality indexes with zero by means of one-
sample t-tests. Since the nationality by trait dimension interaction was not significant, we ana-
lyzed the data across a single sample encompassing both Americans and Italians. The morality
index (M = .03, SD = .2), 95% CI of the difference [.01, .06], was significantly different from
zero, t(220) = 2.38, p = .018, d = .16. Also the difference between the competence index
(M = .07, SD = .2), 95% CI of the difference [.04, .1], and zero was significant, t(220) = 5.2,
p< .001, d = .35 (Fig 6).
Fig 6. Results of the analysis on the likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviors in Study 4. The difference between
the likelihoods of trait-inconsistent behaviors for the positive and negative poles of traits (restrictiveness index) was
significantly positive for both morality-related and competence-related traits. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g006
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Discussion
The results of Study 4 showed that the findings of the previous studies hold cross-culturally.
Indeed, both American and Italian participants provided the same pattern of likelihoods of
trait-inconsistent behaviors for competence and morality. However, the significant main effect
of nationality indicates that the perception of positive hierarchical restrictiveness was more
pronounced among the Italian participants than among the American participants. In particu-
lar, both competence and morality indexes were closer to symmetry for Americans than for
Italians. We could interpret this finding as evidence of a cultural effect on implicit assumptions
about trait-behavior relations. However, crucially, and in line with the favorability account
given by Rothbart and Park [28], both competence and morality indexes were non-negative
for both Americans and Italians. In other words, participants assumed that target persons with
a positive (either competence or morality although, overall, more so for competence) trait
would more likely engage in trait-inconsistent behaviors than target persons with a negative
trait would.
Small-scale meta-analysis
According to “the new statistics” by Cumming [49,50], an additional value of 95% CIs is that
they provide information about the replicability of the findings. In the long run, a 95% CI will
include, on average, 83% of the means of replication experiments. That is, the probability that
a replication of one of our study will give a mean that falls within the particular 95% CI we
obtained for that study is, on average, .83 ([49], p. 126).
In our studies, we obtained consistent evidence about the hypothesized positive asymmetry
of morality-related traits at moderate levels of both traits and behaviors. In all studies, the 95%
CI of the difference between zero and the morality index was made up of positive values and it
never included the zero (which is the value that indicates the symmetry of restrictiveness
between the two trait poles). Furthermore, the effects of the positive asymmetry along the
morality dimension were always at least small to moderate in size (d range: .37-.7) according
to the threshold proposed by Cohen [51], with the exception of Study 4 (d = .16) and one of
the dependent variables (the (Eq 1) index) used in Study 3 (d = .23).
The relative comparison between morality-related and competence-related trait-behavior
relations is not consistent across the studies we conducted. Looking at the 95% CI for the dif-
ference between morality and competence, this did not include the zero in Study 2 and when
we used the (Eq 1) index in Study 3. In those studies, the direction was toward a higher positive
asymmetry for morality than competence. However, the effect was small in Study 3 (Cohen’s
corrected d: .25). Only in Study 2 the effects were large and moderate (Cohen’s corrected
ds = .87 and .54). In Study 4, the 95% CI for the difference between morality and competence
did not include the zero either, but it indicated a higher positive asymmetry for competence
than for morality although the effect was small (Cohen’s corrected d = .21). In contrast, the
95% CIs of the difference included the zero, thus indicating no significant differences between
competence and morality, in Study 1, in the pretest reported in S5 Text, and in S7 Text when
using the “cue-validity index” ([16], p. 692). The effects were tiny (Cohen’s corrected ds range:
.05-.1) except for the pretest described in S5 Text (d = .39).
Cumming [49] recommended the small-scale meta-analysis as a technique that allows
researchers to combine the results obtained from different studies that investigate similar ques-
tions to increase the precision of the parameter estimates. Therefore, to both increase precision
and reconcile inconsistencies across studies about the morality vs. competence comparisons,
we meta-analytically combined the results from the effect sizes reported in Studies 1–4
(N = 409). We considered the data on the larger sets of traits for Studies 1–2, the findings of
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Study 4 and we used the results obtained with the (Eq 1) index in Study 3, whereas we did not
consider either the results of the pretest reported in S5 Text or the findings obtained with the
“cue-validity index” ([16], p. 692) presented in S7 Text.
The meta-analysis showed that the weighted combined Z-score for the asymmetry indices
between competence and morality was not statistically significant, Z = -.62, p = .95. Further-
more, the effect size for the asymmetry indices between competence and morality was close to
zero, r = .19, d = -.06. The meta-analysis conducted on both the competence and the morality
indices with zero, which represents the perfect symmetry, showed that both competence-
related traits, Z = 4.23, p< .001, and morality-related traits, Z = 4.29, p< .001, significantly
differed from zero.
The effect sizes for both competence, r = .07, d = .43, and morality, r = .33, d = .43, were
small to medium. In conclusion, both morality- and competence-related traits were asymmet-
ric on the positive pole.
General discussion
This research provided a unique account of the perceived trait-behavior relations along the
morality (versus competence) dimension by focusing on the moderate levels of both traits and
behaviors and on the general variability measure (which captures the perceived general fre-
quency of behaviors [17]). We tested the hypothesis of a positive asymmetry in the morality
dimension: moral people would be perceived as more likely to act inconsistently than immoral
people would. This hypothesis was based on previous theories and findings showing the nar-
rower dispersion associated with immoral traits [29,30,31,32], the lack of negativity effect in
information integration when morality-related traits and behaviors are moderate [26], and the
favorability effect in trait confirmability and disconfirmability [28]. We used both abstract
(Studies 1–2, and Study 4) and concrete (Study 3, see also S5 Text) categories of behaviors and
we examined the effect with both Italian and American participants (Study 4). As shown by a
small-scale meta-analysis we conducted on data from the four studies, the relation between
trait poles and behaviors was positively asymmetric for the morality as well as for the compe-
tence dimension. In other words, a person described by a moral trait was thought more likely
to emit inconsistent (i.e., immoral) behaviors than an immoral person was thought to engage
in inconsistent (i.e., moral) behaviors. We found the same positive asymmetry for compe-
tence-related traits. Competent persons were judged more likely to engage in trait-inconsistent
behaviors than incompetent target persons (Fig 7).
The similarity of the effect in morality and competence is in keeping with findings from the
literature on the confirmability and disconfirmability of traits [28]. Furthermore, historically,
there has been an emphasis on cognition in moral functioning which thus might be conceived
as affected by competence [52,53]. This view is consistent with classical philosophical work on
morality by Aristotle and Kant that pointed out the role of practical reason and wisdom in
moral virtue [54,55] (see also [6,12]).
In our analysis, we focused on moderate rather than extreme traits and behaviors as people
are more likely to encounter them in everyday life. Furthermore, moderate levels have not
been squarely addressed in previous empirical investigations.
Trait-behavior relations along the morality dimension
In our studies, we found that more behavioral flexibility was associated with target persons
with a positive rather than a negative morality-related trait. For example, “covering for some-
body” was considered by our participants to be a behavior that could be manifested by sincere
persons (although it was perceived as a behavior pertaining to insincerity). Conversely,
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insincere persons were less likely to be associated with inconsistent behaviors such as “telling
the truth” (a behavior associated with sincerity).
The narrower behavioral range that we found for negative trait poles both in the compe-
tence and in the morality domain dovetail with range theories of impression formation such as
those by Wyer [29] and Birnbaum [30]. Previous studies [29,30] have shown that negative and
extreme behaviors have narrower distributions of possible values that can assume than moder-
ate and positive behaviors. Our findings are compatible with this view in that they show that
people with negative, moderate traits are perceived as more behaviorally restricted than people
with positive, moderate traits regardless of trait content. Our results also dovetail with recent
findings on trait attribution and impression updating. An immoral trait is inferred from an
immoral behavior more readily than an unsociable trait is inferred from an unsociable behav-
ior, that is, people make immoral assumptions about others [34]. Furthermore, immoral
behaviors have more impact on people’s morality evaluations than moral behaviors [56].
Although we did not ask our participants to estimate the number of instances required to
confirm or disconfirm that a person possessed a trait, our results might be interpreted coher-
ently also with Rothbart and Park’s [28] findings concerning the influence of trait favorability
on the confirmability and disconfirmability of trait concepts. Rothbart and Park found that
favorable traits are difficult to acquire but easy to lose, whereas unfavorable traits are easy to
acquire and difficult to lose. In our studies, participants perceived that persons with a positive
(i.e., favorable) morality trait could be associated with immoral (i.e., unfavorable) behaviors in
addition to moral ones. If moral persons are associated also with immoral behaviors, their pos-
itive moral disposition might be more easily challenged than if they are perceived as behavior-
ally restricted. Indeed, the fact that they also engage in immoral behaviors exposes moral
persons to more instances that disconfirm their moral disposition than if they engaged almost
exclusively in moral behaviors. Along the same lines, in our studies, persons with a negative
(i.e., unfavorable) morality trait were associated with more difficulty with trait-inconsistent
behaviors than with trait-consistent behaviors. If persons deemed immoral are associated
almost exclusively with negative (unfavorable) behaviors, it will be more difficult to disconfirm
Fig 7. Representation of the hierarchical restrictive schema according to the results of the present research. Positive competence-
(left) and morality-related (right) traits (e.g., intelligent and honest) at moderate levels of both traits and behaviors. +, and − indicate positive
and negative traits/behaviors, respectively. Solid arrows indicate strong trait-behavior relations, whereas dashed arrows indicate weak trait-
behavior relations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0180686.g007
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the unfavorable trait ascription because they are assumed to rarely engage in positive (favor-
able) moral behaviors.
Our findings concerning the structures of morality traits might be explained by a motiva-
tional principle (e.g., [2]). Our participants assumed that moral people (e.g., fair persons)
could also behave inconsistently (e.g., unfairly), whereas immoral individuals (e.g., unfair
persons) were assumed to hardly ever behave inconsistently (e.g., in a fair way). These
implicit assumptions might be the result of the need to avoid the aversive consequences of
immoral behaviors. An emphasis on potentially negative consequences in the interpersonal
context is in keeping with an over-protective strategy (e.g., [2,57]), whereby people prefer to
incur false positive rather than omission errors (see also [33]). Therefore, individuals prefer
to hold the preconception that other people might generally behave less morally than a strict
definition of their disposition would suggest, whereas the immoral disposition is considered
to be stable.
Inconsistencies in the literature
There are methodological differences that could account for the discrepancies between our
findings and results of classic work on the same topic (e.g., [27], Study 3; [16], Experiment 1).
Tausch et al.’s [27] Study 3 used a “diagnosticity” measure similar to the one we used and they
focused on moderate trait-behavior relations as we did. However, the authors of that study
considered the broader dimension of warmth rather than only morality-related traits. Further-
more, they used only abstract behavioral categories to test the likelihood of trait-inconsistent
behaviors (see [27], p. 550), as did Reeder et al. [17]. Skowronski and Carlston ([16], Experi-
ment 1) used concrete behaviors, but considered only one moderate trait (i.e., honest/dishon-
est) on the morality dimension (and one moderate trait, that is, intelligent/stupid on the
competence dimension). Furthermore, they examined five different behavioral levels (i.e.,
“extremely honest”, “moderately honest”, “honesty neutral”, “moderately dishonest”, and
“extremely dishonest”). Similarly to Tausch et al., in their analysis collapsing over the extrem-
ity of behaviors, they found the negative asymmetry in morality and positive asymmetry in
competence that we should expect for extreme levels of both traits and behaviors and for the
moderate trait-extreme behavior relations [17].
In our studies, we focused on a systematic analysis of trait-behavior relations at the moder-
ate levels of both traits and behaviors. Our studies did not examine whether trait-behavior rela-
tions differed as a function of the level of the extremity of either the disposition or the
behavior. It is likely that very extreme immoral behaviors, such as murders or terrorist acts
(e.g., “placing razor blades in children’s Halloween apples”, [18], p. 69), are not perceived as
belonging to the behavioral repertoire of an even moderately moral person (see Fig 1 and
[17]). Skowronski and Carlston ([16], Experiment 1) and Tausch et al. ([27], Study 3) have not
systematically examined the distinction between moderate and extreme traits and behaviors.
Hence, a question for future research is whether and how trait-behavior relations vary as a
function of the different levels of extremity of either a trait or a behavior along the morality
and competence dimensions using also the potential variability and the intended variability
measures, thus further deepening Reeder et al.’s analysis [17]. Future research should also
establish whether the different results in our studies and in the study by Skowronski and Carl-
ston ([16], Experiment 1) are due to the influence of different levels of morality-related behav-
iors on people’s judgments or to a peculiarity of the honest/dishonest trait. At the inferential
level of the trait-attribution process, it has been noted that morality traits such as honest/dis-
honest might entail a different implicational schema than morality traits such as charitable/
uncharitable (e.g., [12]).
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In addition, in our studies, we did not consider either dispositional factors (e.g., a specific
target’s ability to perform a behavior, which is captured by the potential variability measure
[17]) or situational factors (e.g., social desirability, which affects the attempts to emit certain
behaviors and it is captured by the intended variability measure [17]) that might affect trait-
behavior relations.
For all these reasons, the overall wider range of behaviors associated with moral disposi-
tions relative to immoral dispositions that we found is not necessarily in contrast with previous
findings concerning morality attributions that showed, for example, that morality attributions
were less affected by situational demands when immoral rather than moral behaviors were
observed (e.g., [24]). In other words, our results are not necessarily at odds with the negativity
biases characteristic of the moral domain (e.g., [58]). In contrast, they show how negative
assumptions about someone’s morality are relevant not only in trait attributions [34], but also
where trait-behavior relations are concerned. People might hold the implicit assumption that
individuals with a moral disposition might also engage in behaviors that are inconsistent with
their disposition, as the results of our studies suggest. However, when forming an impression
based on an observed immoral behavior (e.g., [35], Experiment 2), people might still tend to
weigh this non-correspondence heavily due to the negativity bias (e.g., [14,59]) or the adjust-
ments made to consider social and situational demands (e.g.,[20,21,60,61]). This is even more
likely if the trait attribution is based on extreme behavior instances rather than the moderate
behaviors we examined in our studies. Indeed, Wojciszke and colleagues [26] found that the
negativity bias in the morality domain disappeared when participants made trait inferences
and evaluations of a target described by moderate rather than extreme morality-related behav-
iors. Within this framework, people’s final attribution based on immoral behaviors could still
be correspondent and less subject to the influence of social pressure, situational demands, or
contextual factors (e.g., costs or rewards) than their attributions based on moral instances
[20,24]. Furthermore, they will readily reach a negative conclusion about someone’s morality
based on an immoral behavior [34].
Future directions
Given the limited research conducted on moderate trait-behavior relations, our research
might provide scholars with traits and behaviors that could be used in future studies. In our
studies, we used different indexes to quantify the restrictiveness of a personality trait (see Eqs
(1), (5), and, in S7 Text, Equation (7)). These indexes represent different, but converging ways
of characterizing the perceived likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviors at the two poles of a
trait. Future studies might investigate whether and to what extent different degrees of restric-
tiveness elicit different expectations (e.g., [42,62]), search strategies (e.g., [45,63,64,65]), or
final trait inferences.
A further extension of this research could address the issue of the neurophysiological corre-
lates of the perceived positive asymmetry in morality trait-behavior relations. Prior work has
shown that semantic anomalies elicited a N400 component in event-related brain potential
(ERPs, e.g., [66,67]; for a review, see [68]). By recording ERPs from participants who read
trait-consistent and trait-inconsistent behaviors referring to a moral/immoral target person, it
would be possible to see whether N400 is elicited or, in line with our results, whether semantic
anomalies are not perceived by participants when reading about immoral behaviors associated
with moral persons.
Our findings can be further specified in light of research on stereotyping. Trope’s [69] and
Reeder’s [20] attribution models assume that the initial identification of a target’s behavior and
of a target’s trait is influenced, among other factors, by prior information such as the actor’s
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social group membership and stereotypes about the target person. Future studies could investi-
gate whether prior information, in particular stereotypes, might also influence the implicit
assumptions about trait-behavior relations that guide the correction stage [20]. Reeder envis-
aged this possibility in the discussion of his model of trait inference by arguing that variables
that influence the initial dispositional characterization of the actor could interact with trait-
behavior relations (see [20], p. 592). Trait stereotypicality and social group membership might
shape perceived trait-behavior relations. More precisely, we might expect a stronger positive
asymmetry for traits that are stereotypical of an outgroup (e.g., “intelligent” and “religious”,
traits that are considered stereotypic of Jews by Italians [70]). Along the lines of Biernat and
Ma’s study [39] on trait confirmability, future studies could thus address how stereotyping
affects trait-behavior relations. In line with this approach that looks at the impact of trait-
behavior relations on intergroup relations, Duran, Renfro, Waller, and Trafimow [71] found
that a hierarchically restrictive schema can characterize not only trait-behavior relations, but
also behavior-group membership relations. In particular, they found that sexual orientation is
a hierarchically restrictive trait.
The results of our research cast light on a neglected area of the attribution research, but,
besides their theoretical relevance, they also bear potential implications for contexts in which
personality traits and their perception can influence decision making. For instance, holding a
negative assumption about a defendant’s morality, such as a focal hypothesis of guilt, can con-
tribute, if no corrections take place, to judgmental biases in legal contexts. As for the assump-
tions underlying the competence dimension, concerns about someone’s ability within work
and organizational contexts might lead to conservatism in hiring decisions, negotiations, and
performance appraisals.
Conclusions
The present research extended previous work on one of the determinants of trait attribution,
namely, trait-behavior relations. In particular, we systematically examined the moderate levels
of the perceived behavioral range associated with the positive and negative poles of a trait con-
tinuum by using different information formats (probability vs. frequency), categories of behav-
iors (abstract vs. concrete), and participants’ nationality (Italians vs. Americans). The results
indicated that trait-behavior relations for morality traits are positively asymmetric, with the
positive pole of a trait being perceived as more behaviorally unrestricted than the negative one.
Competence-related traits were also perceived as positively asymmetric, with target persons at
the positive pole of the trait continuum being seen as more behaviorally flexible than those at
the negative pole. These findings shed light on some inconsistencies in the literature (e.g.,
[27]). They also cohere with previous results from range theories (e.g., [29,30,31,32]), informa-
tion integrations studies [26], on the influence of trait favorability on the confirmability and
disconfirmability of trait concepts [28], on impression updating [56] and on trait assumptions
[34].
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